Using tobacco industry documents, we examined how and why the tobacco industry sought to influence science and scientists in Germany as a possible factor in explaining the German opposition to stricter tobacco regulation.
Smoking and health research programs were organized both separately by individual tobacco companies and jointly through their German trade organization. An extensive network of scientists and scientific institutions with tobacco industry links was developed. Science was distorted in 5 ways: suppression, dilution, distraction, concealment, and manipulation.
The extent of tobacco industry influence over the scientific establishment in Germany is profound. The industry introduced serious bias that probably influenced scientific and public opinion in Germany. This influence likely undermined efforts to control tobacco use. and 140 000 deaths, or 1.5 million lost life-years, each year. [1] [2] [3] Germany has nevertheless been remarkably reluctant to implement effective tobacco regulation and is noted within Europe for its dearth of effective tobacco control policies and its repeated attempts to block the passage of European tobacco legislation. [4] [5] [6] [7] The country has been portrayed as the tobacco industry's paradise. 8 Close links between the German government and its powerful tobacco industry have been alleged, 9 and industry journals refer to Germany as "a strong supporter of the tobacco industry." 10 Germany is a major importer of leaf tobacco and exporter of tobacco products, with tobacco accounting for about 1% of Germany's gross domestic product.
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The release of internal tobacco industry documents through litigation in the United States allows us to gain further insight into the influence of the tobacco industry in Germany. Two 1998 legal settlements led to the public release of an estimated 40 million pages of previously confidential, internal tobacco industry documents. 12, 13 Previous document-based research has shown how the tobacco industry has established and funded a number of research organizations and networks of consulting scientists that purport to fund or undertake independent research. [14] [15] [16] Their true purpose, however, has been to produce data favorable to the industry that could be used to refute the scientific consensus on smoking's impact on health, and to influence public opinion, legislation, and litigation. 14, 17, 18 Much of the research using tobacco industry documents has so far focused on the efforts of the American tobacco industry, while work on Germany has been limited to a single study revealing what the author termed "shameful science." 19 Our essay builds on and extends this work, in particular by drawing on previously unexplored Germanlanguage documents. We examined in detail how and why the tobacco industry sought to influence the German scientific community and their research and thereby the German policy environment. Our essay thus contributes to the debate over the performance, publication, and ethical acceptability of tobacco industry-funded research. 17, [20] [21] [22] [23] 
METHODS
Under the terms of a 1998 legal settlement with the state of Minnesota, leading tobacco companies were required to make their internal records public in depositories in Minnesota and in Guildford, England. The subsequent Master Settlement Agreement stipulated that, with the exception of British American Tobacco and the Liggett Group, they post their documents on public Web sites.
Industry documents, including confidential letters, reports, statements, and minutes, were identified through online searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu) and the Tobacco Documents Online Web site (http://tobaccodocuments.org), conducted between June 2003 and September 2004. In contrast to previous work, 19 documents were identified through use of both English-and Germanlanguage search terms. An iterative approach was taken that initially used broad search terms to identify documents, which in turn revealed the names of key players, events, and places that could then be used as subsequent search terms. The initial terms included "German*," "scientific," "Verband" and "VdC" (German Association of Cigarette Industries), and "Forschung*" and "Rauchen und Gesundheit" and their English equivalents "research*" and "smoking and health." These search terms identified a very large number of documents, so more complex searches using Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT) were then performed. In total, over 2238 documents were reviewed, including 681 documents identified under the search terms "Forschung*" AND "Rauchen und Gesundheit" (almost all in German). Although searches were not restricted to a specific time frame or tobacco company, documents from RJ Reynolds, Philip Morris, and the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (VdC, German Association of Cigarette Industries), dated between 1975 and 2002, provided most of the information. All relevant documents were analyzed in detail to construct a historical and thematic narrative. Additional information was obtained from the published literature.
Where the authors have translated documents from German, this is stated. Otherwise, documents are quoted verbatim from the original regardless of the quality of the English.
RESULTS

Objectives and Rationale of the Scientific Strategy
The accumulating evidence of the harmful effects of active and, more importantly, passive smoking led the tobacco industry to recognize in the 1970s that research was required to fight the decreasing social acceptability of smoking. 24 The industry began to commission so-called "smoking and health" research from external scientists to help provide greater credibility than was possible through internal industry research. 17, 16, 25 This "extramural research" 26 took place in several countries, including Germany.
27-30
Philip Morris documents outline the rationale: that research "should be 'at arm's length,' in order to protect the Industry or individual Companies from litigation." 25 Reasons for sponsoring such research included "1. To secure scientists who could act as potential experts for Industry, 2. To secure goodwill support on critical issues, 3. To push scientific extremists into isolation, 4. To have work published which is suited to reestablish a balanced view in the scientific community, i.e., defuse critical issues." 26 Philip
Morris also emphasized that "the professional quality of the research scientists," as well as "the capabilities of the research institution" in which the commissioned work was to be carried out, were important for the "legal effectiveness," "credibility," and "bargaining value with authorities" of the industry's sponsored research.
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Contemporaneous to the general strategy was the development of a strategy specific to Germany. A confidential 1976 Philip Morris memorandum explains how the (German) Research Council on Smoking and Health (described in the next section) "is necessary in Germany to be used as a 'shield' by the industry. . . that would be above doubt." 31 Similarly, in 1979, Frank Colby, scientific director of RJ Reynolds (RJR) USA, described the objectives of RJR's German smoking and health research program:
To establish relations of mutual trust with leading scientists beyond the grants-as scientific advisors, as a resource to find "witnesses"-if needed-for liability litigations, governmental bodies, etc. as a confidential source of information on the activities of our adversaries, etc. . . To increase the credibility of the Company in its relations with the German Health Ministry and other governmental authorities.
27
Structure and Elements of the German Scientific Network
In Germany, the industry's smoking and health research programs were organized both separately by individual tobacco companies and jointly through their trade organization, the VdC.
32-34
The VdC was founded by several German and transnational tobacco companies to represent company interests on noncompetitive issues; the companies were represented on all relevant VdC committees, including the board. Links between the industry and scientists, which started to develop as early as the 1950s, 19 gained momentum in the 1970s with the development of an extensive network of individual scientists and scientific institutions with links to the tobacco industry. 27, [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] The documents allow us to distinguish at least 6 elements of this network (Figure 1 ), many characterized by attempts to obscure their industry links. The structure and functioning of the Forschungsrat, in particular its relationship with the industry, caused considerable controversy among VdC member companies and the VdC presidency. 76, 87, 88 On the one hand, the industry wanted the Forschungsrat to be relatively independent, so that research findings advantageous to the tobacco industry would be more credible and influential. On the other hand, some industry
Box 1-Three Examples of German Scientists Directly Funded by the VdC
One tobacco industry document lists 110 research projects directly funded by the VdC between 1977 and 1991; it names over 60 scientists involved. 35 An RJR employee reports, "These are projects which are 'contracted' and which have been handled by the Verband [VdC] since about 1977. . . . The Verband has total control over the design of the experiments, the right of the researchers to publish or not to publish, etc. These projects likewise need to be kept confidential to the outside." 32 The documents indicate that between 1982 and 1991, Professor Jürgen von Troschke, head of the Department for Medical Sociology at the Albert-Ludwigs-University in Freiburg and of the German Coordinating Agency for Public Health, undertook several projects on the "psychosocial benefits of smoking." [41] [42] [43] The VdC provided over DM1 million ($615 000) for these projects.
35 Von Troschke appears to have published the results of these projects in German public health journals without mentioning the source of funding or any conflict of interest. 44, 45 Minutes of a VdC meeting in 1991 report that "Prof. v. Troschke has requested approval of further funds (DM 138.000/year) for his smoker motivation study . . . Indeed, a 1984 report describes a "presentation by Prof. Von Troschke" at this government working group: "[H]e presented his ideas of psychosocial benefits of smoking; he described smoking as a regularly satisfying experience for the smoker which perhaps might reduce workplace absenteeism. Hence, Prof. Troschke concluded, health information programs for smoker are paradox." 47 According to industry documents, Professor Helgo Magnussen, who at the time this article was written was president of the German Association of Pulmonology 48 and medical director of a major pulmonary hospital in Germany (Krankenhaus Großhansdorf, Zentrum für Pneumologie und Thoraxchirurgie, Hamburg), received between 1989 and 1993 35,49 over DM420 000 ($260 000) 35,50 from the VdC for research projects 51, 52 investigating "the influence of passive smoking on the respiratory function in asthmatic subjects." 53 According to the minutes of a VdC meeting, "He found that passive smoking does not result in any acute reactions of the respiratory tract in patients with bronchial asthma." 54 A number of additional steps were taken to ensure industry control of this "independent" research council. Only the chairman could make public statements on its behalf; members required his permission to do so. 37 Rather than advertising for research proposals, selected scientists were to be informed about funding opportunities. 84 Furthermore, the bylaws guaranteed the attendance of 2 VdC representatives as guests 78 (his letter appears not to have been published) and when writing review articles for German medical journals. [97] [98] [99] In the 1980s, the Forschungsrat became increasingly subject to criticism from individual journalists and scientists for being influenced by the tobacco industry. 73 In the late 1980s, Fritz H. Kemper, director of the Institute for Pharmacology and Toxicology at the University of Münster, acted as scientific advisor and consultant for RJR in connection with the introduction of a new tobacco product in Germany. 113 Internal industry documents provide evidence of the close relationship between Kemper and RJR.
In January 1988, Kemper attended a briefing in the United States to learn about the new product. 113 Afterwards, the RJR executive vice president wrote to Kemper, "Dear Fritz, It was a distinct pleasure having the opportunity to meet you and I enjoyed immensely our dinner session. It was especially encouraging, too, to hear your comments regarding our special project, and we appreciate very much the support you are giving us." 112 Kemper's services were covered by a consulting agreement, which included a confidentiality clause; it was signed by RJR and Kemper in 1988:
You agree to make yourself available as a consultant to RJR at the request of the Research and Development Department. . . During the term of this agreement, you shall refrain from any action or conduct which is inimical or opposed to the interest of RJR. . . Any information developed by, or disclosed to, you in connection with services performed hereunder whether oral, written or observed while on RJR premises shall be regarded as strictly confidential.
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A fee for Kemper of $1200 per day was agreed upon.
117 A 1988 RJR document shows that he received $20 000 that year.
118 A secret letter 113 from an RJR employee to Kemper gives an example of his tasks: "You have expressed your agreement to sign up [i.e., verify] the scientific documentation on the SPA-related research as a scientist who has been given access to the data and who has evaluated the whole program. You are in agreement that your name will be mentioned in that regard." The "SPA" project, which involved the development of a new tobacco product that heated tobacco instead of burning it, led to the development of Premier, a "safer cigarette" that RJR claimed was virtually without tar or adverse effects on health.
Kemper agreed to prepare a scientific paper "on the very fundamental pharmacological and other differences between nicotine on the one hand and addictive drugs on the other" 113 to support RJR's attempt to deny the addictive properties of nicotine. Kemper also acted as an information source for RJR. A document notes that he provided "a list of names of selected people in the German scientific community, which [ Colby appears to have selected scientists according to a number of criteria: (1) whether their work was of interest to the industry, (2) whether their attitude was generally positive toward smoking, (3) whether the scientist had sufficient doubts about the harmful effects of smoking, (4) 
Methods of Distorting Science
The evidence presented thus far suggests that tobacco-related scientific output in Germany was heavily influenced by the tobacco industry. 29, 76, 88, 109, 131, 135 Additional documents outline how this influence worked in practice. Taken together, they allow identification of the following 5 methods for influencing scientific knowledge. Dilution. The selective funding of research and the recruitment of scientists who had doubts about the adverse health effects of smoking, or whose previous work had found no links, led to the funding of research projects designed to find no association between smoking and disease. 30, 131 This probably caused dilution of genuine studies, introducing severe bias into the evidence base, especially when meta-analyses were later undertaken.
Distraction. The industry selected and supported a large number of research projects that aimed to distract attention from smoking by investigating other potential causes of smokingrelated diseases 131 -so-called "confounder studies." Research focused, for example, on psychosomatic aspects of and familial and genetic links to tobaccorelated diseases. Studies asked whether chronic respiratory diseases and the desire to smoke had a common psychogenic origin, such that "any alleged statistical associations between smoking and certain changes in respiratory parameters may (or may not) be coincidental rather than causal." 27, 131 Concealment. It seems that in order to increase the credibility and impact of the studies presented, whenever possible, favorable scientific results were presented and published by a "third party"-a scientist whose connection to the industry could be hidden, 115 with the industry's in- When a researcher 133, 134 mentioned the RJR funding for his project in a publication, Colby wrote to him, "please remember that the contract indicates that we prefer that we be consulted regarding such mentioning before a paper is sent out to a journal or other publisher."
148
Manipulation. Some articles and presentations were vetted by the industry before publication or presentation. A Philip Morris document reports, "The VdC has influenced Dr Schmähl and his group to speak out against a poor publication which is hurting the industry. . . The VdC is also influencing publications which will be presented at the Fourth World Health Conference that deals with the cost to the economy because of smoking." 146 
DISCUSSION
Tobacco document research is fraught with difficulties, most notably that of ensuring that searches identify all relevant documents, particularly given inconsistencies in indexing.
149 Although our search sought to be comprehensive, it is likely that because of problems with the coding and indexing of documents, particularly those in languages other than English, we have discovered only part of the total. This is particularly the case since the Internet documents cover only some of the companies operating in Germany, with British American Tobacco largely excluded. The extent of industry influence over the scientific and medical establishment in Germany revealed in this essay is profound and, we suggest, greater than that documented in many other countries. The documents show, for example, that RJR had a far larger scientific network in Germany than elsewhere in Europe. 27 However, this number is likely to be only a fraction of those who accepted funding, either through these organizations or through the Forschungsrat, INBIFO, and other tobacco companies. Many were eminent scientists based in some of the leading German universities and with the potential to play a key role in policy development. According to industry documents, for example, Schievelbein of the German Heart Center in Munich, who appears to have received funding from the VdC, 35 was also separately approached by RJR because of his links with the German government and journalists. 29 The sheer number of scientists collaborating with the tobacco industry and, in some cases, the intensity of their involvement are remarkable. While there were many scientists who received only small amounts of funds, many others became deeply involved with the tobacco industry, which begs the question of how this was achieved.
There appear to be a number of reasons. First, it is apparent that some scientists (especially those whose links to the industry were in the 1970s or perhaps even the 1980s) did not realize the implications of accepting this funding, or that they would be working within a system so tightly controlled by an industry that was assuring them-often falsely-that they would have full independence. This is illustrated by the letter of a scientist who did not receive a reply from the industry to his research proposal. In the United Kingdom, a goodpractice protocol has just been signed and a code of practice on tobacco industry funding to universities has been released.
158,159
Finding the scientific truth was not the aim of the tobacco industry. Instead, it sought to manipulate and distort the evidence. The documents suggest it achieved this through the selective recruitment and funding of scientists and projects likely to produce favorable results, the suppression of unfavorable findings, the promotion of favorable findings, and the promulgation of alternative explanations for diseases associated with tobacco use. Importantly, major and often complex efforts were made to hide industry links at each stage of the process-from recruitment to publication. However, when RJR directly approached researchers, it attempted to reassure them of their "complete 'freedom' regarding the results and their publication,"
114 something that other documents suggest was far from likely. The evidence presented in this essay suggests that the industry introduced serious bias into published research that probably influenced scientific consensus and public opinion in Germany. This is likely to have increased the social acceptability of smoking, influenced the policy context, and undermined efforts to control tobacco use, just as the industry desired. Our findings suggest that the influence of the tobacco industry on science and scientists in Germany may be an important factor in explaining the opposition of Germany's health policymakers to stricter tobacco regulation.
Thus, in surveys of German public opinion conducted within the European Union, the level of support for a ban on smoking in public places, a policy now being enacted in other European countries, is among the lowest. 160 Within the European Union, Germany's smoking rates among men are exceeded only by those of Greece and some of the central and eastern European countries that joined the European 
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